United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

75-1159

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Docket No. 75-1159

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellec,

-vs.-

GANDOLFO ALBANESE,

Defendant-Appellant.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

APPENDIX FOR APPELLANT



RICHARD I. ROSENKRANZ
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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Brooklyn, N.Y. 11201
TR 5-9440-1

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PAGINATION AS IN ORIGINAL COPY

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CRIMINAL	No. 100 L DOCKET	740R	814 1000	
	TITLE OF	CASE	ATTORNEY	•
	THE UNITED ST	TATES	For U.S.: WEINTRAL	UB
	vs.		200	
	JERRY BATTILOR			
	STEPHEN GORONS	SKY		
	X FRANK DU BOIS	mor also lives!!		
	X GANDOLFO ALBAN		•	•
	NICHOLAS GREGO	ORIS aka "El D", "Ni	ek" Defendant:	
				100
Did o	conspire to distribute an	d did possess hero	in	
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A	BETRACT OF COSTS AMOUNT	DATE	NAME RECEIVED	T
Fine,				+-
Clerk,		HATT Rote of o	THAN MIFSE	1
Marshal,				
Attorney,				
Commissio	ner's Court,			
Witnesses,				
		<u> </u>		
				-
				1:
DATE		PROCEEDINGS		
2/23/74	Before BARTELS, J Ind	ictment filed and	ordered sealed by the	Cour
	Bench warrant ordered.	(Gregoris)		
1-2-75	Before JUDD, J - case	called - all defts	present with counsel	
	except for deft GREGOR			
	unsealed by the Court -	all defts that we	re present arraigned	and
	enter pleas of not guil	ty - bail set in p	revious indictments t	ю
1 00 7	cover this case - case		r trial.	
1-29-7				
/7/75	Befre JUDD, J Case ca			
	being advised of his r	ights by the court	and onhis own behal	foat
	his plea of not guilty			
	fatual basis for the p	(A.s.)	is conto- sendence ad	a wi

74CR 814

DATE	PROCEEDINGS		
2110-75	Before Judd, J - case called - adjd tp 3-3-75 at 11:00 A.M. for trial.		
2/10/85	Affidavit of Ira London, esq. filed		
2-13-75	Notice of Motion filed, to sever the deft Gandolfo Albanese for		
	purposes of trial, pursuant to Rule 14, F.R.C.P. (ret. 2-21-75)		
2/14/75	Before JUDD, J Case dalled- Deft ALBANESE and counsel present- Other de and counsel not present- Govt't motion to sever deft Albanese from trial		
	on 3/3/75- motion argued- granted with condition that deft Albanese be		
	tried immediately after trial of other defts- Case adjd to 3/3/75 at		
-	10:00 A.M. for trial as to defts Battiloro, Goronsky and Gregaris		
2/14/75	By JUDD, J Order filed that trial of deft Albanese is to follow those		
2/14/13	of above defts (order on back of motion papers)		
/19/75	Before JUDD, J Case called = Deft ALBAMESE' counsel present - Deft's mot		
122/13	to dismiss on basis that special atty Weintraub was unauthorized to		
	proceed before the Grand Jury- motion argued- motion denied		
2-20-7	5 Bench Warrant Issued (Gregoris)		
2/27/75	Stenographers Transcript dated 2/19/75 filed		
3/3/75	Before JUDD, J Case called- Defts Battiloro & Goronsky present with		
-, 1115	counsel-Case adjd to 3/4/75 for disposition.		
3/4/75	Before JUDD, J Case called- Marked ready and passed to 3/6/75 at 10:00 A)		
	for trial as to ALBANESE- Defts BATTILORO AND GORONSKY present with coun:		
	defts after being advised of their rights by the court and on their own		
1	behalf withdraw their pleas of not guilty and enter pleas of guilty on		
, is	count 1- Court finds factual basis for both pleas- deft BATTILORO sentence		
<u> </u>	to custody of atty general for study and report pursuant to T-18, U.S.C. Sec. 4208(b)(c)- Execution of sentence stayed to 3/14/75- Court recommend:		
.4	commitment at Danbury Conn deft GORONSKY sentered to the custody of the		
<i>F</i> ()	atty general for study and report pursuant to T-18, U.S.C. Sec. 4208(b)(c		
1.	execution stayed to 3/14/75- court recommends commitment at Danbury Conn.		
11.1	pre-sentence reports to be prepared in normal course		
3/4/75	Judgments and Commitments filed- certified copies to Harshal		
0/4/75	Govt's request to charge filed		
3-10-75	, and the second		
1 ×	not present - Bench Warrant ordered - adjd to Mar. 11, 1975 for trial.		
3-13-7			
3-13-7	Before JUDD, J - case called - marked ready & passed (ALBANESE)		
0/14/75	Certified manyxas copies of judgments and commitments retd and filed-		
14-	defts delivered to Federal Detention Headquarters (GORONSKY and BATTILORO		

74 CR 814 CRIMINAL DOCKET

	CRIMINA	L DOCKET
	DATE	PROCEEDINGS
3,	/18/75	Before JUDD, J Case called- Marked ready and passed to 3/19/75
3	-19-75	Before JUDD, J - case called - deft ALBANESE & counsel Richard Rosenkranz present - Audibility hearing begun and concluded -
•		Tapes found to be audible - trial ordered & BEGUN - Jurors
		selected and sworn - Govt opens - Deft Opens -Trial continued
•		
1,		to Mar. 20, 1975@ 10:00 A.M.
: : :	3-20-75	Before JUDD, J - case called - deft ALBANESE & counsel present -
		trial resumed - Juror #3 reported sick and replaced by Alt.#1-
		defts motion to dismiss argued - motion denied - contd to 3-21-75
* 3	/21/75	Before JUDD, J Case called - Deft ALBANESE and counsel present - Trial
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	· 	resumed-Deft rests-Deft renews motion to dismiss- motion denied- deft sumss-Govt sums up- Jury retires to deliberate-Jury returns and=render
6		a verdict of guilty as to counts 1,2,3- Trial concluded- Jury discharg
1		Bail contd- Case adjd to 4/4/75 at 9:30 A.M. fpr sentence
her		Before JUDD, J - case called & adjd to 4-10-75 for sentence of
1.40	4-3-75	deft Frank Du Bois.
*.a	/4/75	Before JUDD, J Case called- Deft and counsel present- Deft sentenced
· "	14/13	to imprisonment for a period of 9 years to run concurrent on counts
1		1,2 and 3 plus a special parole term of 6 years- Court recommeds commi
i		ment at Lewisburg so that deft's aged parents don't have to travel to
1.1		Atlanta to visit- Deft advised of his right to appeal- deft remanded
. 4	4/4/75	Judgment and Commitment filed- certified copies to Marshal (ALBANESE)
	4/4/75	Notice of appeal filed (ALBANESE)
2	/4/75	Docket entries and duplicate of notice of appeal mailed to c of a
14,1	4/7/75	
16	1	to Federal Detention Headquarters (ALBANESE)
4	4-10-	75 Before JUDD, J - case called & adjd to 4-24-75 for sentencing
1 Y		as to deft FRANK DU BOIS.
	4-23-7	Record on Appeal certified and handed to J.Gil for delivery
3		to the Court of Appeals (Albanese)
* 1	4-24-75	
1 1		of Record on Appeal and filed (Albanese)
	4-24-75	Before JUDD, J - case called & adjd to May 1, 1975 at 11:00 am
1		(sentencing of deft Du Bois)
	5-1-75	Before JUDD, J - case called - deft DU BOIS & counsel S.Katz
()		present - deft sentenced to imprisonment for 4 years - execution unsupervised
1		of sentence is suspended and the deft is placed on probation for
N.		4 years plus 3 year special parole term on count one . On motion of

		4a
		The state of the state of
DATE	PROCEEDINGS	
1=75	AUSA Weintraub counts 2 and 3 are dismissed.	
k#25	Judgment & Commitment filed - certified copies to Ma	arshel (DV BOIS)
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	•	b contract of the contract of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-v-

JERRY BATTILORO
STEPHEN GORONSKY
FRANK DU BOIS
GANDOLFO ALBANESE, a/k/a "Moe"
NICHOLAS GREGORIS, a/k/a "El D", "Nick the Greek"

DEFENDANTS

THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:

COUNT ONE

On or about and between the 24th day of April, 1974, and the date of this indictment, both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere, the defendants Jerry Battiloro, Stephen Goronsky, Gandolfo Albanese, a/k/a "Moe", Nicholas Gregoris, a/k/a "El D" and "Nick the Greek" and Frank Du Bois knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully did conspire with each other to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute quantities of heroin, a Schedule I narcotic drug, in violation of Title 21, United States Sode, Section 341 (a) (1).

[Title 21, United States Code, Section 846]

COUNT TWO

On or about the 29th day of April, 1974, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendants Jerry Battiloro, Stephen Goronsky, Gandolfo Albanese, a/k/a "Moe" and Frank Du Bois knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully did distribute approximately 106.9 grams of heroin, a Schedule I narcotic drug controlled substance.

[Title 21, United States Code, Section 841 (a) (1); Title 18, United States Code, Section 2]

SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT

21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a) (1

18 U.S.C. § 2

74 CR814

COUNT THREE

On or about the 8th day of May, 1974, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendants Jerry Battiloro, Stephen Goronsky, Gandolfo Albanese, a/k/a "Moe", and Frank Du Bois knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully did distribute approximately 223 grams of heroin, a Schedule I narcotic drug controlled substance.

[Title 21, United States Code, Section 841 (a) (1); Title 18, United States Code, Section 2]

A TRUE BILL

FOREMAN

IAVID G. TRAGER
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----X
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

-against-

NOTICE OF APPEAL

74 CR 814

GONDOLFO ALBANESE,

Defendant.

Name of Appellant: GONDOLFO ALBANESE

Name and Address of Attorney: RICHARD I. ROSENKRANZ

66 Court Street Brooklyn, N.Y. 11201 Tel: 212-875-9440

Offense: Count 1: Violation of Title 21, U.S.C., Section 846; Count 2 and 3: Violation of Title 21, U.S.C., Section 841(a)(1); Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2.

CONSCISE STATEMENT OF JUDGMENT GIVING DATE & OFFENSE:

Guilty on Count 1, March 21, 1975, violation of Title 21, U.S.C., Section 846. The defendant disconspire to commit an offense against the United States Government.

Guilty on Count 2, March 21, 1975, violation of Title 21, U.S.C, Section 841(a)(1), violation of Title 28, U.S.C., Section 2, the defendant did knowingly and intentionally distribute approximately 106.9 grams of heroine.

Guilty on Count 3, March 21, 1975, violation of Title 21, U.S.c., Section 841(a)(1), violation of Title 18 U.S.C., Section 2, the defendant did knowingly and intentionally distribute approximately 223 grams of heroin.

Sentenced to 9 years on Count 1, sentenced to 9
years on Count 2 and sentenced to 9 years on Count 3

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL, ETC.

on April 4, 1975, impriosnment on each Count to be served concurrently and an additional six years

Special Parole Term upon release from custody.

Gondolfo Albanese, the above named appellant, hereby appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from the above stated judgments.

Dated: April 4, 1975 Brooklyn, New York

Don't talk about the case amongst yourselves or anyone. Don't talk to anyone in the courtroom.

Don't make up your mind and you haven't heard the whole thing or the summations. Thank you.

(The jury leaves the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Mr. Rosenkrantz?

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: At this time at the close of the Government's case, the defendant Albanese specifically moves for judgment of acquittal on the ground the Government has failed to make out a prima facie case.

I would especially address myself to the two substantive counts where it is alleged Mr. Albanese took part in direct sales, and there is no evidence that — even assuming, as we must at this time— that the Government witnesses are telling the truth, even if we credit Mr. DuBois with that, there's no proof what he says he received from Mr. Albanese was the same narcotics that the agents testified they received from the defendants Battiloro and Goronsky.

THE COURT: I think the objection you made at side bar is more pertinent with respect to the substantive counts than it is with the conspiracy count. Let me hear what Mr. Weintraub says on that.

MR. WEINTRAUB: First of all, your Honor, the sequence of events, I think, leads to a fair inference that the same narcotics are involved.

In fact, on one particular occasion, as Agent Lieneck testified, he observed the actual transfer from the trunk of Mr. DuBois' car to Mr. Battiloro, and that meshes with Mr. DuBois' testimony that he received the narcotics the same day that he gave it to Mr. Battiloro, and had it in the trunk of his car and both testimonies show it was immediately before the second transfer of a quarter of a kilogram of heroin.

Even without that direct observation, the time sequence would certainly permit a fair inference it was the same narcotics involved.

Not only that, but Mr. Albanese's admissions on the tape very strongly indicate he was aware that he was dealing with Mr. Battiloro and Mr. Goronsky.

THE COURT: They certainly, I think, support the conspiracy charge.

Do they support the two substantive charges?

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: Your Honor, Mr. Goronsky

and Mr. Battiloro could have had other customers,

other suppliers. There's no proof directly linking,

as it must, between Mr. Albanese and the Government agent.

THE COURT: There's no proof that conclusively links them, but isn't there circumstantial proof?

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: I don't think sufficient for the substantive counts. I would tend to agree that there might be enough--well, there doesn't have to be any actual narcotics for the conspiracy count, but I think for the substantive counts, I do not agree there is sufficient.

THE COURT: Mr. Weintraub, Count 2 is a sale of a little less than an eighth on April 29, and Count 3 is a little less than a quarter on May 8th.

Was May 8th the one when they were arrested?

MR. WEINTRAUB: No, sir, May 15th. That transfer took place in Manhattan.

THE COURT: That was the third one.

MR. WEINTRAUB: The indictment, I understand, was not brought because of the jurisdictional problem with that.

THE COURT: Which is the one where you say
Mr. DuBois observed the transfer?

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: Which transfer, your Honor?
MR. WEINTRAUB: The second transfer.

THE COURT: Where he observed Mr. Battiloro take the package out of his car.

MA. WEINTRAUB: Alleged in Count 3.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: Your Honor, even on that count, we don't have any proof that what he saw Battiloro take out of his trunk is the same narcotics that was alleged to have been given to the agents. There's no proof of that. There again is the missing link.

MR. WEINTRAUB: Your Honor, Mr. Rosenkrantz would place the judicial process in a straitjacket. How are we to know that narcotics is not the same unless we have a government agent and/or informant with the narcotics every minute of the time that it is being transferred, moved or in any way handled during the transaction?

THE COURT: There are cases where they are arrested at the time the money passes.

MR. WEINTRAUB: That would be quite a restriction to place on the Government, the People of the United States.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: Especially where we have Mr. DuBois testifying he never looked inside any of the packages. He has testified to that.

MR. WEINTRAUB: He didn't--

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: Yes, he did. He testified under my cross-examination that he never looked

inside the packages that he allegedly took from Mr. Albanese or that he later gave back to Mr. Albanese.

THE COURT: I think the tapes imply

Mr. Albanese was satisfied that they were the same
packages.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: We still don't know if that's what got to the agents.

THE COURT: The Court of Appeals has said circumstantial evidence doesn't have to point to the result of the exclusion of every possible inference. This is a jury question. If you wind up with some cases that show that it's a problem of law, I'll reconsider it at the end of the case, but I think it's a question of fact, Mr. Rosenkrantz.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: I can understand the question of fact as to conspiracy, but as to the posession, either you have possession of a particular property or you don't. Here there is no evidence that what the agents have testified to and what was put into evidence subject to connection have been directly connected with Mr. Albanese. In other words, there's no testimony that that narcotics is what was allegedly received from him.

MR. WEINTRAUB: There's circumstantial proof

it's the same matter; they were dealing in large quantities of money, dealing in narcotics, and it would be an awful coincidence to assume that three transactions on two sides of Mr. DuBois paralleled each other without the connection that Mr. DuBois has testified to.

THE COURT: It is a question of the weight of circumstantial evidence.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: Mr. DuBois testified there was another supplier involved with these people.

MR. WEINTRAUB: In cocaine. We're not dealing with cocaine.

MR. KOSENKRANTZ: I don't think he limited it to cocaine.

MR. WEINTRAUB: He certainly did. You asked him about a supplier in Florida. He said cocaine.

THE COURT: Vinnie said he's his customer.

Vinnie, I gather, is in the heroin business.

I think it's up to the jury whether that creates a reasonable doubt as to whether this particular piece of heroin came from Mr. Albanese. I'll deny the motion.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: That's on May 8th.

THE COURT: I think the same thing applies to both.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: Judge, on the other there's no evidence at all.

THE COURT: On the other, you may not have Mr. Battiloro watching it taken out, but Mr. Battiloro--

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: You mean Mr. DuBois.

THE COURT: Mr. DuBois. Mr. DuBois said he gave it to Battiloro and the agent got heroin from Battiloro a short time later.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: In order to connect

Mr. Albanese, we have to assume the only narcotics

being delivered from Battiloro to the agents was

that which he received from DuBois, and the evidence
is contrary to that.

I don't think the jury can be asked to speculate, which is indeed what they're going to do, that this is the only material that they received and they dealt in.

THE COURT: There's no evidence that they received heroin from anyone else. There is a statement of Vinnie, said they were his customers, but not at what time.

MR. WEINTRAUB: Mr. DuBois' statement he originally introduced them to Vinnie, but that that didn't work out, and he then went and made a contact with Mr. Albanese, which may well lead,

I think it shows why Vinnie perhaps felt they should have been his customers.

THE COURT: I think it's an issue of fact.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: I would also move for dismissal on all three counts, on the ground there has been no evidence that the defendant Albanese was aware that this material was going to be dealt in Brooklyn, the narcotics were going to be dealt in Brooklyn.

THE COURT: That doesn't matter.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: Well, I thought I'd raise it anyway.

THE COURT: No, conspiracy can be prosecuted wherever any overt act takes place.

I'll see you all in the morning.

No further requests?

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: Only as to character.

THE COURT: Only character.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. WEINTRAUB: Thank you.

(Time noted: 3:20 p.m.)

Time noted: 2:15 p.m.

THE COURT: We are ready to proceed. Bring in the jury, please.

(The jury enters the jury box.)

THE COURT: Mr. Weintraub, Mr. Rosenkrantz, Mr. Albanese, Miss Tripp, and Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury:

about all along, about the instructions on the law. You have heard the arguments of counsel, and you're going to determine the facts with that in mind.

When I give you the law, you have to follow the law as I give it. I follow, to some extent, written papers, to be sure I'm as accurate as may be.

what I do is first describe the general principles that apply to all criminal trials, then the nature of the charge in this case and the specific rules of law that apply to those charges, some suggestions about how you should evaluate, weigh the evidence that you have heard, and a few comments on the evidence, and finally something about how to reach a verdict.

It's the duty of the parties, various ways, the prosecutors duty in our adversary system of

justice to do his best to prove the Government's case. The defense counsel's duty is to represent his own client's interest. It is my duty to enforce the rules of evidence and state what the law is, and it is your duty to decide the facts, which includes deciding the truth or falsity of the testimony.

You're to follow my instructions on the law, but you're the sole judges of the facts. You're to perform your duties without bias or prejudice for or against any party. The law doesn't permit jurors to be governed by sympathy, prejudice or public opinion.

The law presumes the defendant is innocent of crime. So the law permits nothing but legal evidence presented before the jury to upset that presumption and to be considered in support of a charge against the accused.

The presumption of innocence is enough in itself to acquit a defendant unless the jurors are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt on a particular count from all the evidence in the case.

I'm going to say a few words about what the law means by a reasonable doubt. The words are

based on reason and common sense arising from the state of the evidence or absence of the evidence.

A reasonable doubt doesn't mean a doubt that a juror assemts arbitrarily in order to avoid performing an unpleasant task. It goesn't mean beyond all possible doubt, because it is very rarely possible to prove anything to an absolute certainty.

One of the tests that is used in this area for proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that it refers to the sort of doubt that would make you hesitate to act in your own important affairs, this being an important affair for both parties.

This rule of proof beyond a reasonable doubt operates on the whole case. It doesn't mean that each bit of evidence must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but it means the sum total of the Government's evidence less any cross-examination or defendant's evidence must satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt as to each element of the crime charged or else you must acquit.

Finding a person to be guilty of a felony and subjecting him to criminal penalties is serious, and you have a right to consider this fact in

deciding whether you have a reasonable doubt, but if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, then you must find him guilty and not be swayed by sympathy.

An indictment, as you have heard before, is not evidence of any kind against the accused. It is just a formal method of accusing the defendant of a crime. The defendant has pleaded not guilty. The indictment and the plea create the issues which you must decide.

The law never imposes a duty on a defendant in a criminal case to produce any evidence or to testify. The fact that the defendant did not testify does not create any inference with respect to the truth of the testimony against him or with respect to his guilt, and you must not talk about it when you're in the jury room. That's not a fact.

I'm going to read the indictment for you so you know exactly what you're passing on. It has three counts, two of conspiracy and one that we call substantive, which is the actual passing of heroin.

Count 1 charges that "On or about and between the 24th day of April, 1974, and the date of this indictment," which was December 23, 1974,

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both dates being approximate and inclusive, within the Eastern District of New York," which is all of Long Island and Staten Island, "and elsewhere, the defendants Jerry Battiloro, Stephen Goronsky, Gandolfo Albanese, also known as 'Moe,' Nicholas Gregoris, also known as 'El D' and 'Nick the Greek,' and Frank DuBois, knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully did conspire with each other to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute quantities of heroin, a Schedule I narcotic drug, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1)." This count also refers to Title 21, Section 846.

Count 2 charges, "On or about the 29th day of April. 1974, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendants Jerry Battiloro, Stephen Goronsky, Gandolfo Albanese, and Frank DuBois knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully did distribute approximately 106.9 grams of heroin, a Schedule I narcotic drug controlled substance." There is a reference to Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1) and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2, which I will mention in a few minutes.

Count 3 charges, "On or about the 8th day

Charge of the Court

of May, 1974, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendants Jerry Battiloro, Stephen Goronsky, Gandolfo Albanese, and Frank DuBois, knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully did distribute approximately 223 grams of heroin, a Schedule I narcotic drug controlled substance."

It refers to the same section.

It's not required that the dates and amounts be exactly accurate as long as they are approximate and sufficient so that the indictment has given notice to the defendant of the fact of which he is charged. If you will notice, the amounts in the two substantive counts are a little bit less than an eighth and the other a little less than a quarter of a kilogram. That difference is not significant here.

In connection with the law, I'll mention

first Section 841(a)(l) of Title 21, which is part

of the drug abuse prevention and control act. This

section provides that except as authorized by this

subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person

knowingly or intentionally to manufacture,

distribute or dispense or possess with intent to

manufacture, distribute or dispense a controlled

substance, "controlled substance," is defined in another section of the Code -- and heroin is specifically listed as one of the opium derivatives which is a controlled substance under Schedule I of that section.

"Distribute" is defined in another section of the same section, 812, Title 21, as meaning simply to deliver. "Distribute" doesn't mean passing it out to a lot of people on the street. The turning over of a package of heroin from one person to another is a delivery and therfore is a distribution.

I won't review the range of penalties because these are for a judge to determine if there is a finding of guilty.

The statute requires that the distribution or possession be knowingly or intentionally. An act is done knowingly if it is done voluntarily and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason. A transaction is not intentional unless it's knowing. So the two words pretty much are synonymous. They fit together.

The first count refers also to Section 846, which is the conspiracy count. That reads: "Any

person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both, which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."

With reference to the first count, then,
the essential elements necessary to establish the
offense of conspiracy can be divided into four:

First, there was an agreement between two or more people;

Second, the defendant willfully became a member of the conspiracy;

Third, one of the conspirators took some step to accomplish the purpose of the conspiracy;

Fourth, that that step was knowingly done in furtherance of some purpose of the conspiracy, which here is said to be the distribution and possession with intent to distribute, of heroin.

The burden is always upon the prosecution to prove every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. The person can become a member of the conspiracy without knowing all the details of the conspiracy. When you determine

whether a conspiracy existed, you can consider the acts and statements of all the alleged members, but in determining whether Mr. Albanese was a member of the conspiracy, you can consider only his own acts and statements. He can't be bound by the acts or statements of other participants until it is established that there was a conspiracy and that he was one of its members.

When it does appear beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed and the defendant was a member, then statements knowingly made and acts knowingly done by any member of the conspiracy may be considered as to the defendant who is found to be a member even though they may have occurred in his absence and without his knowledge, provided they were knowingly made or done during the existence of the conspiracy by a member of the conspiracy and in furtherance of some object or purpose of the conspiracy.

A conspiracy requires at least two members,
but it is not necessary that more than one be on
trial at a time. You're concerned only with
Mr. Albanese's quilt. You shouldn't speculate
as to what happened to Mr. Battiloro or Mr. Goronsky

or why they're not on trial at this time. In fact, if only Mr. DuBois and Mr. Albanese were involved in the conspiracy, that's enough to satisfy the requirements of the statute.

In connection with Counts 2 and 3, the indictment refers also to Section 2 of Title 18 of the United States Code. This says, "Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission is punishable as a principal." That means that somebody who helps another person commit a crime is just as guilty as if he did it himself.

With respect to the substantive counts,
Title 341 counts, the sale counts, there are just
two essential elements of the crime: first, the
act of distributing heroin as alleged, and second,
knowingly or intentionally.

In reference to each of these counts, the burden is on the Government to prove each of the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden rests with the Government all through the trial. It never shifts to the defendant. If you have a reasonable doubt as to any element on any

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count, you must acquit on that count just as you have a duty to convict if you're persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of the crime.

Now I come to some of the rules on evaluating evidence.

cenerally speaking, there are two types of evidence from which a jury can proceed to find the truth of the facts in a case. One is direct evidence, the testimony of an eyewitness. The other is indirect or so-called circumstantial evidence, that proof of a chain of circumstances that logically point to the existence or nonexistence of certain facts.

Here we have direct testimony by Mr. DuBois that the defendant provided him with heroin. We have circumstantial evidence on the authenticity of the tapes, for instance, Mr. DuBois and Mr. Albanese were seen together just before and just after the conversation that is said to be recorded on the tapes.

The defendant points to circumstantial evidence that maybe the tapes aren't authentic because there was a gap between the time when Mr. DuBois left Billy's bar and the time when

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Charge of the Court

the agents caught up with him and found where he was and said they took the tape off him.

between direct and circumstantial evidence.

Circumstantial evidence to establish guilt doesn't need to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. It's only necessary that a jury be satisfied of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of all the evidence in the case, both direct and circumstantial.

Circumstantial evidence alone can be enough to convict if you find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the whole case.

Now with respect to the scope of what you can consider: When you analyze evidence you can draw reasonable inferences based on your own common sense and your general experience, but only from facts that you find were proved. You can't speculate as to things for which there is no evidence, but you're not confined to the bare bones of the testimony.

Credibility is a problem here, and that's one of the difficult aspects of your duty. It's the theory of American justice that twelve citizens

selected as a cross-section of the community and screened to eliminate any preconceptions can best determine the truth of a charge.

witnesses, you use some of the same types of judgment you do when people are trying to persuade you to do anything in your life. Here you consider the relationship of the witnesses to the Government, to the defendant, their bias or interest in the outcome of the case, their manner while then testifying, their candor, their intelligence, as you have observed them.

the extent to which any evidence has been corroborated or contradicted by other credible testimony.

Give thought to inconsistencies within the testimony of any witness, either on direct examination or cross-examination, and whether any witness has changed his testimony.

omnibus. If a witness lied, you can say you won't believe anything the witness testified. You can also say part of what the witness said on the witness stand may still be true.

Charge of the Court

The same with inadvertent inconsistencies.

They may lead you to disregard a witness's testimony in whole or in part, but a witness may have been mistaken or untruthful with respect to part of his or her testimony and be correct and truthful with respect to other parts. For instance, if Mr. DuBois was truthful about having been a professional jewel thief for fifteen years, which goes back before his 1962 conviction, you can determine whether that's true or whether other things that he said are true or not true. It's for you to decide in each case.

One thing more on this: Where you find there is an inconsistency or change in testimony, you should consider whether involves a detailed or important part of the testimony. You can consider in your own experience where you have heard repetitions of the same story by the same person or by different persons, whether they're exactly the same each time they are told or when each person tells them and whether variations of that sort indicate falsehood or inaccurate memory or have some other explanation.

We had some Government agents testify in

Charge of the Court

this case. As a rule, with respect to them you're not to give any greater weight or credibility to the testimony of a witness solely because of the fact he's a Government agent. You don't give any less credit on that account. The testimony of a Government agent should be evaluated in the same manner as you would evaluate the testimony of any other witness.

called accomplice testimony. Mr. DuBois was an accomplice of Mr. Albonese according to the Government's view of the case. An accomplice is somebody who joins with another person in the commission of a crime, voluntarily and with common intent. An accomplice is not incompetent as a witness because of his participation in the crime. On the contrary, the testimony of an accomplice alone, if you believe it, may be of sufficient weight to sustain a verdict of guilty even though it's not corroborated or supported by other evidence; but you should keep in mind this rule, that the testimony of accomplices should always be received with caution and weighed with care.

You can also consider the fact that

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Mr. DuBois in giving testimony against Mr. Albanese may have hoped for some leniency in punishment or some other personal advantage. Give what weight you see fit to that.

You should never convict the defendant upon the unsupported testimony of an alleged accomplice unless you believe the unsupported testimony beyond a reasonable doubt. Here the Government contends that Mr. DuBois' testimony finds support in the taped conversation of Mr. Albanese in which he expressed concern about the money that he was owed for the four eighths of a kilo that was received by the Government agents from Battiloro and Goronsky and for which no payment had been made, and he discussed with Mr. DuBois ways in which to satisfy the higher-ups in the heroin trade by making some partial payment and satisfying the balance of the debt from profits on further heroin trading.

One other factor with respect to Mr. DuBois: testimony of a witness can be discredited or impeached by showing that he has been convicted of a felony. This is a circumstance which you may consider, but it is your province to determine

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the weight to be given to any prior conviction as affecting the credibility of statements made on the witness stand.

A word about reputation evidence. Where a defendant has offered evidence of good general reputation for truth and honesty, a jury may consider that evidence along with all the other evidence in the case. Evidence of a defendant's reputation inconsistent with those traits of character that are ordinarily involved in the commission of a crime charged may give rise to a reasonable doubt, since a jury may think it improbable that a person of good character with respect to those traits would commit such a crime. Although this is described as character evidence, it's really just reputation evidence. A man's actual character may or may not be accurately reflected by his reputation and his acts. That's only known to him. You're to determine the weight to give the reputation evidence.

There's a lot of discussion been given to tapes. I tell you as a matter of law the use of tape recording devices in order to provide a contemporaneous record of a conversation is a permissible method of investigation in cases where one

party to the conversation has agreed to the recording.

The law is that somebody who is engaged in illegal activity takes the risk that his conversations will be reported or recorded by the persons with whom he talks.

rinally, on evaluation, I'll mention you're not to decide the case or any issue on the basis of the number of witnesses or number of exhibits.

Your decision depends upon the quality of the testimony and the credibility of the witnesses and not the number of witnesses or the length of their testimony. The fact that the Governme. ad more testimony than the defendant, that's not in itself a decisive matter.

You should not be influenced by the fact there were objections to some questions or some items of evidence that I sustained. You're not to guess what the answer would have been to a question that was ruled out, and you're to disregard any evidence that I struck out, and consider the case only on the testimony and exhibits that I admitted into evidence and the stipulations of the parties which were placed in the record and which have the effect

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of evidence.

A federal judge has a right to comment on the evidence, to marshal it. I'm not going to duplicate what counsel has done. I'm just going to cover a few points. In reviewing the evidence you should consider the case as a whole, not just individual parts. Mr. DuBois' testimony standing alone certainly has some weaknesses; even apart from his uncertainty about details of price and the order in which specific packages were delivered to him. It's for you to determine whether he was sure that the defendant gave him packages last April and Mar which he said contained heroin. Even if Mr. DuBois wasn't sure about the price or the days, you should consider the DuBois testimony in connection with the taped conversation of June 3rd, 1974, to see how far it's confirmed or strengthened by the statements that are attributed to Mr. Albanese in that conversation, and that it applied to particular individuals who ultimately distributed the heroin and dates and times mentioned by the agents in connection with the undercover sales.

You can determine if there is in your mind any reasonable doubt that the defendant was really

the one whose voice and words are on the tape; if they are not his, they don't count against him.

Mr. DuBois is a professional jewel thief.

You can consider that in connection with his testimony. Mr. Albanese is a hard-working butcher.

Another factor to consider is that Mr. DuBois apparently was a good enough friend of the defendant so that Mr. Albanese, if we believe the surveilling agents, went into Billy's Bar and spent an hour with him.

remarks on there that might be prejudicial. Bear in mind the defendant is not on trial for anything except the charges in the indictment. Anything on the tapes is significant only to the extent it may indicate whether Mr. Albanese had a part in the conspiracy to distribute heroin and to possess heroin for the purpose of distributing it and whether he in fact turned over or delivered heroin on the dates in April and May to Mr. DuBois.

In evaluating the evidence, you should also keep in mind the difference between the conspiracy count and the substantive counts. Count 1, the conspiracy count, needs proof of two or more people

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knowingly agreeing to distribute or possess heroin but it doesn't require any showing that the heroin was actually delivered to any particular defendant.

Counts 2 and 3 relate to specific sales, one on April 29, 1974, and one on May 8, 1974. If the defendant actually delivered heroin to Mr. DuBois that's a distribution, quite apart from the later delivery by Mr. DuBois to Battiloro or Goronsky. On those, Mr. Albanese would be an aider and abettor.

Mr. Rosenkrantz pointed out it is possible
the heroin which Battiloro and Goronsky sold to
Agent Alleva was something that they got from another
heroin dealer or that the packages that were
analyzed by the chemists were not in fact the
packages that Mr. Albanese delivered to Mr. DuBcis.
You can determine from the evidence whether this
leaves you with any reasonable doubt that the heroin
that was purchased by the agent did in fact come
from Mr. Albanese.

In other words, it's possible to find the defendant guilty of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt and not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Count 2 or Count 3. That's for your determination.

Dubois would testify against someone he's afraid of. I should let you know that federal law has provisions that permit United States marshals to protect witnesse— ho are in danger. There's no guarantee that the protection will be one hundred percent effective, but there's no evidence in the case that Mr. DuBois was afraid of anyone except for the remarks on the tape. You can consider the Government's right to protect the witness in determining what weight to give to the arguments that Mr. DuBois wouldn't testify against someone he feared.

What I have said in connection with the evidence or any other part of the charge is not to be taken as an expression of opinion on the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

It doesn't mean what I have mentioned is the only significant evidence. You must consider everything as you have in your mind.

You're the judges of the facts. Nothing that counsel said or I said prevents you from making your own determination of the facts on your own recollection of the evidence

and applying to those facts the law as I have set it forth.

Now a few words about reaching a verdict. Your verdict must be unanimous on each count. That means that you all have to agree. It's a good idea to discuss the evidence rather fully before you take even a tentative vote, so that no one will jump to a hasty conclusion before weighing the entire case. Again, your recollection of the evidence governs, not what I have said or what counsel has said. If you're in disagreement and you want some of the testimony repeated, you make the request and I'll call you into court and have the reporter read those portions that you want to hear. You may be kept waiting for a while because it takes some time to find the reporter who took it and to locate the portions of the notes that you ask for.

When you go back to the jury room this trip,
Juror No. 1 will act as your foreman, preside over
your deliberations. Two things she should do:
make sure that everybody has a chance to talk, and
generally not more than one person talks at a time.

During your deliberations you should all

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assume the attitude of judges of the fact, not partisans or advocates. In that way you're making a high contribution to the administration of justice.

You must report a verdict on all three counts. You can find the defendant guilty on all counts or any one or two of them, not guilty on all counts or on any one or two of them.

when you have reached a verdict, Miss Tripp simply gives the marshal a note saying you have reached a verdict. Then when you're back in the courtroom she will report the verdict orally and either party has the right to have the jury polled, which means to ask each juror whether the verdict is in fact his or her verdict, so we know it's unanimous.

I repeat, with respect to the punishment, in determining guilt or innocence, you should not give any consideration to the matter of punishment. for this is exclusively the responsibility of the judge if the defendant is found guilty.

There will be a marshal available outside the jury room to let the Court know if there are any questions you want to have answered or report

when you have reached a verdict.

You're each entitled to your own opinion, but you should exchange views with your fellow jurors and listen carefully to each other. You needn't hesitate to change your opinion if you're convinced what you thought at the beginning is not right, but your final decision must be your own.

As I said before, you can determine how
long to sit. Normally I say if you haven't reached
a verdict by five-thirty, I'll excuse you. Tonight
is Friday and tomorrow is Saturday and it's a long
week-end, but we don't keep people unduly late here
in order to force them to reach a verdict.

I'm at the anticlimax of my instructions
now, because the law provides that after a judge
has instructed the jury, counsel may call attention
to anything on which he has misspoken or left out.
When you're back in the jury room, I'll give them
an opportunity to do that.

I'll give the final paragraph now, in case

1 don't have to bring you out again. Remember when
you go into the jury room, your oaths sum up your
duty, that is, without fear or favor to any man,
you will well and truly try the issues between the

parties according to the evidence heard by you in court and the law of the United States.

Now we'll swear in the marshal.

(Marshal Robert Leschorn was sworn.)

THE COURT: We'll let Mr. Renree go into
the jury room to get his things, and he will report
downstairs. You'll be excused after that.

The marshal can take the jury into the jury room. Go right ahead.

Mr. Renree, don't talk to anybody while you're getting your things.

(The jury leaves the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Any exceptions?

MR. WEINTRAUB: No, sir.

THE COURT: Mr. Rosenkrantz?

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: I would specifically except to your Honor's charge in which your Honor indicated to the jury that it was my argument that Mr. Albanese may have delivered heroin to Mr. DuBois but that this was not the same heroin that Battiloro and Goronsky were alleged to have received. I did not make that argument before the jury. I made that argument— That was a legal argument presented to the Court out of the presence of the jury, and I

at no time conceded to the jury.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: He's shaking his head.

I at no time indicated to the jury that or conceded to the jury that he had passed heroin to Mr. DuBois.

THE COURT: I thought what I said was somewhat favorable, indicating it might be what the chemist analyzed was not what he gave to them.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: I wish you would make clear to the jury I do not concede he passed heroin or knowingly passed heroin to Mr. DuBois.

THE COURT: I thought that was obvious, but-let me see what I said.

No, I said-- Maybe I was wrong in saying you had pointed out, but the packages analyzed by the chemist were not the packages delivered to Mr. DuBois. You don't concede that anything was delivered to him.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: That's correct.

THE COURT: Let me get them in to tell them that.

MR. WEINTRAUB: Anything else?

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: I would specifically except to your Honor's indicating that at one point your

Honor indicated the testimony of Mr. DuBois can be corroborated by the tapes of his conversations with Mr. Albanese, because of course I do not concede he had any conversations with Mr. Albanese.

THE COURT: I said they're to determine whether in fact it was Mr. Albanese's voice on there. I'll leave it that way.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Bring them back.

(Jury enters the jury box.)

THE COURT: I have just one thing to add.

I spoke about the possible defense that the packages analyzed by the chemist were not the packages delivered to Mr. DuBois. The defendant does not concede that any packages were delivered to Mr. DuBois by Mr. Albanese. That's for you to determine on the basis of all the evidence in the case.

Otherwise, the charge stands as it is.

If you have any questions, you can give a note to the marshal. Thank you.

(The jury leaves the courtroom.)

THE COURT: I would suggest you people stay around. If the jury asks questions, they frequently come early.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: Yes, your Honor.

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THE COURT: I will be in chambers.

The you and downstairs, Mr. Meintraub, be where you can be reached by phone.

MR. MUINTRAUB: Yes.

(Time noted: 2:00 n.m.)

(Time noted: 3:45 p.m.)

has reached a verdict. We'll bring them in. The Clerk can mark it.

THE CLERK: Jury note marked Court Exhibit 1.

(So marked)

(The jury enters the jury box.)

saying you have reached a verdict. Will you tell me what the verdict is.

THE FORMAN: We reached a verdict of quilty on all three counts.

TITE COURT: You may be scated.

Do you want the jury polled, Mr. Rosenkrantz?

MR. MOSENKRAHTZ: Yes.

THE COURS: Will you do that.

THE CLERK: Yes, your Honor.

radies and gentlemen of the jury, as the

- 1	30	45a
1	Court	has received your verdict, you say you find
2	the de	fendant guilty on Count 1, guilty on count
3	2, and	guilty on Count 3.
4		Madem Forelady, is that your verdict?
5		JUROR NO. 1: Yes.
6		THE CLERK: Juror No. 2, is that your verdict?
7		JUROR NO. 2: Yes.
8		THE CLERK: Juror No. 3, is that your verdict?
9		JUROR NO. 3: Yes.
10		THE CLERK: Juror No. 4, is that your verdict?
11		JUROR NO. 4: Yes.
12		THE CLERK: Juror No. 5, is that your verdict?
13		JUROR NO. 5: Yes.
14	eske .	THE CLERK: Juror No. 6, is that your verdict?
15		JUROR NO. 6: Yes.
16		THE CLERK: Juror No. 7, is that your verdict?
17		JUROR NO. 7: Yes.
18		THE CLERK: Juror No. 8, is that your verdict?
19		JUROR NO. 8: Yes.
20		THE CLERK: Juror No. 9, is that your verdict?
21		JUROR NO. 9: Yes.
22		THE CLERK: Juror No. 10, is that your ver-
23	dict?	
24		JUTOR NO. 10: Yes.
25		THE CLERK: Juror No. 11, is that your verdict?

JUROR NO. 11: Yes.

THE CLERK: Juror No. 12, is that your verdict?

JUROR NO. 12: Yes.

THE CLERK: Jury polled, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

You reached what I think is probably the only verdict that is proper on the evidence. The defendant
has had good counsel and vigorous defense. You have
seen the extent of work necessary.

I might mention that Mr. Battiloro and Mr.

Goronsky were brought to trial a couple of weeks ago
and they pleaded guilty. Mr. Albanese was not tried
at the time because the tapes that were used against
him would have been incriminating against the other
two defendants, and if they had been used against
the other two defendants, it would have been considered improper, having been said out of their
presence, and Mr. DuBois, of course, has pleaded guilty.
He is under protective custody and I'll have to
determine what to do on sentencing him.

The reason why the indictment was in December, although the offense was in May, is that this is the third indictment. The first one was just against the three, Battiloro, DuBois, and Gregoris. Then when

Mr. DuBois cooperated and named Mr. Albanese there was another indictment against Albanese, and then when the name of "El D" was discovered, there was a third superseding indictment in December which named that individual. That's also one reason why we have been somewhat longer than we try to be in the state courts, although the defendant is not in custody and given six months within which to try him.

I won't say anything more because you're going to be serving here a couple of more weeks.

I don't know what other cases you'll be in.

Thank you for your patience and your attention.

You're excused until Monday morning. Then report

downstairs.

(Jury leaves the courtroom.)

MR. WEINTRAUB: (No response)

THE COURT: Mr. Weintraub, should the defendant be remanded or should he remain on bail?

THE COURT: I would think the guilt was quite clear here and there is not much purpose in continuing him at large.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: Your Honor, I believe the bail of the other two defendants who had prior criminal records was continued after their plea of

quilty. This defendant did go to trial, but he did not testify on his own behalf. There were some legal aspects of the defense. He has no prior criminal record, always appeared. In fact, his surety is present in court, his sister. I don't think there is any risk of his not appearing. He always appeared at all other times knowing the strength of the case of the Government, which we knew about long before trial. There was no attempt to evade the prosecution.

He does have a family and personal affairs that he would like to make some provision for. I would ask the Court to continue his bail. I had spoken to the prosecutor about this and I don't think there is any objection to continuing bail at this time.

MR. WEINTRAUB: I had had thoughts of continuing Mr. Albanese on bail. There are two things that bother me. One is the fact that he is in a different posture, being convicted. The other is he is now working as I understand, as a manager of Bill's Bar. The Government does have indication that Mr. Gregoris, who is a fugitive, may have an interest in Bill's Bar, the same place we discussed during the case. I therefore would

have serious thoughts about whether Mr. Albanese is in touch with Mr. Gregoris and might well seek the same refuge that Mr. Gregoris has sought here.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: As I say, there has never been any indication of that. If it was going to take place or an attempt along those lines were to be made, it would be made before trial--

THE COURT: It might not have been. He might think there's always uncertainty what a jury will do.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: I don't think that's a serious contention in this case. I did advise him of the strength of the Government's case. He was aware of it. Certainly the age of the main witness against him might have been an inducement for him, if he had that type of inclination, but because of his family's property, money that's put up as collateral, I do not believe that he would flee, and I don't believe there's any proof of any sort that he has been in touch with Mr. Gregoris.

THE COURT: That would be very hard to prove.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: I know they have had agents in Bill's on numerous occasions. He has been there regularly. He does have a family to think of. He's not a man without roots in the community. He does have two young children. He

wants to make some provision for them.

THE COURT: Do you think Mr. DuBois is reasonably secure?

MR. WEINTRAUB: Mr. DuBois is reasonably secure. That is not the problem.

THE COURT: That's one of the things I had in mind.

MR. WEINTRAUB: He's relocated out of New York.

THE COURT: It seemed to me Mr. Albanese

might be more of a risk to other people than Bat
tiloro or Goronsky.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: I believe a lot of those things were said in the heat of the moment. There has never been any indication he ever possessed a weapon. In fact, when he was arrested, he was arrested at a time when he would not know there was an indictment out for him, they didn't find a gun on him or in the car.

MR. WEINTRAUB: That is not correct. He was in possession of a gun when arrested. He has a permit.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: What kind of gun?
THE DEFENDANT: I had a permit.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: It was never brought up.

In any event, he would surrender that. He has

always appeared and I thought --

MR. WEINTRAUB: Does he still have that gun?

THE DEFENDANT: No, of course not.

MR. WEINTRAUB: It's a federal violation to be in possession of a firearm that's moving in interstate commerce if you're a convicted felon at this point.

THE COURT: You're not convicted until the sentence.

MR. WEINTRAUB: I stand corrected.

THE DEFENDANT: I surrendered that.

THE COURT: I think I'll leave him at large temporarily, but I think I have heard enough about his background so that I can sentence at least for purposes of appeal without a prelentence report, and I'll put it down for sentence on April 4.

I think he should be prepared to begin serving his sentence then.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: Would your Honor give him at least--that's only about a week and a half.

THE COURT: Two weeks.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: He has two children that he has to make some arrangements for.

MR. WEINTRAUB: Considering that Mr. Rosenkrantz informed Mr. Albanese before this of the

strength of the government's case, I would expect he would have been preparing before this, and two weeks should be more than ample time---

THE COURT: It's more than ample. Two weeks is adequate. I'm going to put it down for sentence on April 4.

MR. WEINTRAUB: Could we set it down for 9:30?

I have to begin a trial before Judge Platt.

THE COURT: 9:30 on April 4. I think I have a right and under Rule 32(c)(1) to direct that the sentence be without a presentence report, but he should report to Probation so that a report can be prepared for consideration by a panel on a motion to reduce in the event of an affirmance.

MR. WEINTRAUB: Thank you, your Honor.
You did all you could with the facts,
Mr. Rosenkrantz.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: Thank you.

THE COURT: I thought Mr. Weintraub made it a little close in getting more corroborative evidence. Never put a witness on the stand unless you need to.

MR. WEINTRAUB: We always have a few towards
Mr. Gregoris' possibly being called, your Honor.

MR. ROSENKRANTZ: I move at this time to

set aside the judgment and conviction on all three counts as being against the law and the weight of the evidence.

THE COURT: You have a right to make the motion, but unless I made some error that the courts find, I think the verdict is proper and I'll deny the motion.

(Time noted: 3:45 p.m.)